Restore Hoor al-Azim!

Five Years After the Khuzestan Water Protests: Restore Hoor al-Azim and Protect Local Communities

To: The President of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Ministry of Energy; the Department of Environment; the Ministry of Petroleum; the Ministry of Agriculture Jihad; the Governor-General of Khuzestan; the Head of the Judiciary; and the Article 90 Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly

22 September 2026

We, the undersigned, call for an accountable, science-based programme to restore Hoor al-Azim, protect the communities that depend on it, and prevent environmental grievances in Khuzestan from again being answered with repression.

In October 2023, Daadkhast published a petition calling attention to the degradation of Hoor al-Azim. Three years later, and five years after the July 2021 water protests, the underlying crisis remains unresolved.

A wetland of regional importance

Hoor al-Azim is the Iranian portion of the transboundary Hawizeh marsh system on the Iran–Iraq border. The Iraqi Hawizeh Marsh is formally designated as Ramsar Site No. 1718, and Ramsar documentation describes the wider ecosystem as extending into Iran, where it is known as Hoor al-Azim. The two sides are ecologically and hydrologically interdependent.

The wetland sustains biodiversity and supports fishing, agriculture, buffalo herding, reed harvesting and traditional crafts. It is particularly important to the cultural and economic life of Ahwazi Arab communities, while its condition affects the health and environment of Khuzestan as a whole.

Over several decades, Hoor al-Azim has been subjected to drought and rising temperatures, changes in the flow of the Karkheh River, dam operations, upstream agricultural consumption, hydrological barriers, oil development and various forms of industrial and agricultural pollution. Scientific research has linked the loss of surface water in Hoor al-Azim and other Khuzestan wetlands to increased dust pollution.

Temporary releases from the Karkheh Dam have occasionally improved inflow. These interventions, however, have not produced a stable recovery. In September 2026, Khuzestan’s director-general of environmental protection reported that water covered less than 38 percent of the approximately 90,000 hectares capable of inundation under normal conditions, and that even the remaining water was of inadequate quality. He estimated the wetland’s annual water requirement under different hydrological conditions at approximately 1.4 to 1.8 billion cubic metres and stated that this requirement had not been fully met in recent years, except during the floods of 2019.

The crisis cannot be attributed to a single cause. Officials have identified persistent drought, insufficient releases, weak coordination among government bodies and the expansion of water-intensive cultivation, particularly rice in the Karkheh basin, as contributing factors. Oil infrastructure, roads, drilling waste and the fragmentation of the wetland have added further pressures.

These concerns have become more urgent following the 2026 environmental approval of the Sohrab oilfield development project. The revised plan reportedly reduces the number and area of well pads, places some facilities outside the protected area, and requires measures such as zero discharge and reduced water consumption. These conditions must be published, independently monitored and enforced, particularly because the project affects Basin No. 1, one of the wetland’s most important remaining water-entry and ecologically viable areas.

In March 2025, seven United Nations Special Rapporteurs wrote to the Iranian government concerning reported environmental degradation of Hoor al-Azim and its effects on public health, livelihoods, housing, water access and the cultural rights of local communities. Iran subsequently submitted a formal response. The exchange underlines the need for current, publicly verifiable information and transparent environmental oversight.

Five years after the 2021 water protests

On 15 July 2021, demonstrations began in Khuzestan over water shortages, the drying of rivers and wetlands, and damage to farming and livestock. The protests became associated with the Arabic slogan “Ana atshan”—“I am thirsty.”

Accounts of the ensuing violence remain contested. A January 2022 communication from United Nations experts relayed reports that at least nine people, including a minor, were killed; that at least 200 people, and, according to some reports, 300, were arrested; and that some detainees were subjected to arbitrary detention or enforced disappearance. The Iranian government rejected allegations of unlawful force and stated that armed violence had occurred, resulting in the deaths of nine individuals and two law-enforcement officers.

The sharp divergence between these accounts makes an independent and transparent investigation necessary. Regardless of political or ethnic identity, residents of Khuzestan have the right to raise concerns about water, pollution, health and livelihoods without being exposed to unlawful violence, arbitrary detention or retaliation.

We call on the responsible authorities to:

1. Publish a time-bound restoration plan for Hoor al-Azim, identifying responsible agencies, annual targets, funding, and measurable indicators for water coverage, water quality, biodiversity and livelihood recovery.
2. Guarantee an evidence-based environmental flow from the Karkheh basin, including a drought-contingency plan, and publish monthly figures for reservoir releases, water delivered to the wetland, actual inflow at monitoring stations and water consumed by major upstream sectors.
3. Bring agricultural withdrawals into conformity with the available water budget, restrict cultivation of unauthorized water-intensive crops in critically dry years, and provide fair transitional assistance to farmers whose livelihoods are affected by these restrictions.
4. Publish the complete environmental-impact assessment and permit conditions for the Sohrab oilfield project, together with baseline water, soil and biodiversity data. No further expansion in ecologically sensitive portions of the wetland should proceed without an independent cumulative-impact assessment and meaningful consultation with affected communities.
5. Conduct an independent environmental audit of existing oil operations, including tests for hydrocarbons, heavy metals and other contaminants in water and sediment. Companies responsible for verified pollution or ecological damage must finance containment, cleanup and restoration.
6. Restore the wetland’s hydrological connections, including the scientific review of roads, embankments, culverts and other structures that obstruct water circulation, while adopting coordinated measures for fire prevention, fish mortality and dust control.
7. Establish a permanent local advisory council composed of independent scientists, farmers, fishers, buffalo herders, women, environmental organizations and representatives of affected communities, including Ahwazi Arabs. Its findings and meeting records should be public.
8. Create targeted livelihood and public-health programmes for communities harmed by wetland degradation, including support for fishing, livestock raising, reed-based crafts and other sustainable occupations, as well as regular monitoring of respiratory and water-related illnesses.
9. Pursue formal cooperation with Iraq on transboundary water flows, wetland fires, pollution, biodiversity monitoring and the long-term management of the Hawizeh–Hoor al-Azim ecosystem.
10. Commission an independent investigation into the deaths, injuries and arrests connected with the July 2021 protests, publish its findings, provide an effective remedy to victims of unlawful conduct, and hold any person found responsible for criminal wrongdoing accountable through fair judicial proceedings.
11. Protect peaceful environmental advocacy, freedom of expression and public access to environmental information, and ensure that future water-related demonstrations are managed in accordance with the principles of necessity, proportionality and accountability.

Hoor al-Azim is a living ecosystem, a source of work and cultural memory, and an essential defense against dust, pollution and displacement. Its restoration requires transparent data, enforceable responsibilities, independent oversight and the participation of the people whose lives are inseparable from the wetland.

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