Public Petition for Immediate and Sustainable Access to Safe Drinking Water in Zahedan and Across Sistan and Baluchestan

13 July 2026

Addressed to:

The President of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Minister of Energy; the Head of the Plan and Budget Organization; the Governor of Sistan and Baluchestan; the Managing Director of the National Water and Wastewater Engineering Company; the Managing Director of the Sistan and Baluchestan Water and Wastewater Company; the province’s representatives in Parliament; and the parliamentary committees on energy, development, and Article 90

We, the undersigned residents of Zahedan and other cities and villages across Sistan and Baluchestan, including Zabol, Zahak, Khash, Saravan, Iranshahr, Rask, Dashtyari, Chabahar, and Konarak, express our grave concern and strong protest over the continuing water crisis and the denial of continuous, sufficient, and equal access to safe drinking water for a large part of the province’s population.

The water crisis in Sistan and Baluchestan is no longer a seasonal shortage or a temporary emergency. It is the result of a combination of prolonged drought and extreme heat, declining surface water and groundwater resources, northern Sistan’s dependence on the Helmand River and the Chah-Nimeh reservoirs, the salinity of some water sources, population growth without corresponding infrastructure development, deteriorating transmission and distribution networks, high levels of water loss, delays in water-supply projects, and weak managerial accountability.

It is therefore inadequate to attribute all of the province’s water problems to drought or to the failure to secure Iran’s share of the Helmand River. Zahedan’s difficulties are not identical to those of the villages of Dashtyari or the coastal cities of Chabahar and Konarak. Each area requires a plan suited to its population, resources, geography, and infrastructure.

Zahedan faces a substantial water deficit

According to the Deputy for Water Operations and Development at the provincial Water and Wastewater Company, Zahedan’s demand during peak periods exceeded 3,000 litres per second in June 2026, while the city’s operational supply capacity was approximately 2,000 litres per second.

In other words, the provincial capital faces a peak shortfall of roughly 1,000 litres of water per second. Officials have identified this deficit as a major cause of repeated outages and low water pressure in many neighbourhoods.

In newly developed areas and national housing complexes, construction and population growth have proceeded without a corresponding expansion of the water network. Field reporting in June 2026 indicated that some families received water on no more than four days a week, often for only a few hours late at night or before dawn. In certain neighbourhoods, pressure was reportedly too low even for household pumps to transfer water into storage tanks.

In temperatures exceeding 40 degrees Celsius, this is not merely an inconvenience. It poses a direct health and safety risk, especially to children, older people, people with disabilities, patients, and families who rely on evaporative coolers.

A significant share of available water is lost before reaching residents

Scarcity is not the only cause of the crisis. Technical estimates by the provincial Water and Wastewater Company indicate that water losses exceed 30 percent in some urban systems and 40 percent in some rural networks.

In a province suffering from severe water scarcity, losses on this scale demonstrate that repairing deteriorated infrastructure must receive the same priority as developing new sources.

Drilling wells, constructing desalination plants, or transferring water will not necessarily provide reliable household access unless leaking pipes are repaired, adequate storage is created, and pressure throughout the network is properly managed.

A town or village may be described in official statistics as “connected to the network” while receiving water for only a few hours a day or several days a week.

Hundreds of villages still lack continuous water

In 2024, the Ministry of Energy reported that 2,351 villages in the province were experiencing water stress or unreliable supply. It announced that 1,751 villages, with a combined population of approximately 554,000, had been included in the national Rural Water-Supply Jihad programme.

At the time, officials said that 401 villages, with around 148,000 residents, had obtained a more stable supply.

These projects are important and should continue. More recent evidence, however, shows that the crisis remains extensive. In June 2026, the parliamentary representative for the Chabahar constituency stated that more than 700 villages in that constituency still lacked continuous and sustainable drinking water.

Addressing these shortages requires the completion of transmission lines, new rural water complexes, greater storage capacity, and expanded desalination.

The gap between the number of announced projects and the number of villages still without reliable water shows that the launch of a project, the installation of pipes, or the inclusion of a village in a government programme cannot be treated as proof that the crisis has been resolved.

The proper measure of success is the volume, quality, and continuity of the water that actually reaches people’s homes.

Official figures have also varied over time. In 2019, authorities reported that 2,726 villages lacked water-supply systems and that approximately 251,000 rural residents depended on tanker deliveries. Later projects have undoubtedly altered these figures, but continued tanker dependence and the lack of continuous water in hundreds of villages show that what was intended as an emergency response has become a long-term arrangement.

The crisis imposes greater costs on poor families

Water outages and low pressure transfer the cost of securing this basic necessity from the state to individual households.

Families are forced to purchase water tanks, pumps, bottled water, or privately delivered tanker water. Low-income households are less able to afford large storage tanks, effective pumps, or private supplies and are therefore more exposed to prolonged shortages, unsafe water, and disruptions to daily hygiene.

In many villages, women and children bear a disproportionate share of the work involved in collecting, storing, and managing the household’s limited water supply.

Water shortages also disrupt schools, health centres, small businesses, livestock raising, and family farming, while contributing to forced migration from rural areas.

In parts of southern Baluchestan, continued dependence on hootags, open ponds used to collect rainwater and floodwater, still threatens children’s health and lives. A report published in April 2026 cited a local health worker’s estimate that between 15 and 20 children may die in hootags each year.

This figure is not a comprehensive official statistic. Nevertheless, documented deaths demonstrate that the absence of safe water sources has consequences far beyond thirst and daily inconvenience.

Water infrastructure must be protected against electricity failures and wartime disruption

The municipal water systems of Chabahar and Konarak rely entirely on desalination plants. In 2024, the provincial Water and Wastewater Company stated that desalination capacity had increased from 40,000 to 48,000 cubic metres per day, although rationing continued.

Recent attacks in Chabahar and Konarak reportedly knocked three electricity transmission lines out of service, two of which were later restored. This incident demonstrated the dependence of desalination plants, wells, pumping stations, and distribution systems on a stable electricity supply.

We do not claim that the war caused the province’s water crisis. The crisis existed for many years before the fighting. However, damage to the electricity network and disruptions to fuel, transport, and spare-parts supply can place an already fragile system at even greater risk.

The government must provide emergency generators, adequate fuel reserves, and replacement equipment for desalination plants, wells, and essential pumping stations.

Local protests must not be ignored

Residents of the province have repeatedly raised the water crisis through peaceful gatherings and protests.

In 2023, people in Zabol held several demonstrations concerning the failure to secure the Helmand water share, the drying of the Hamun wetlands, dust storms, the destruction of local livelihoods, and interruptions to water and electricity. One gathering in August 2023 was reported to have been the fifth water-related protest in the area within several months.

The continuation of such protests shows that this is not only a question of natural water scarcity. It is also a crisis of public trust, transparency, fair distribution, and official accountability.

We acknowledge that the government has undertaken projects in recent years, including the drilling of wells, construction of transmission lines, expansion of desalination facilities, creation of storage reservoirs, and development of rural water networks.

However, Zahedan’s continuing deficit of approximately 1,000 litres per second, extensive network losses, rationing in coastal cities, and the absence of continuous water in hundreds of villages show that these efforts have not yet matched the scale or severity of the crisis.

Our demands

We, the undersigned, call for the following measures:

1. An emergency plan for Zahedan

The Ministry of Energy and the provincial Water and Wastewater Company must publish a plan for addressing Zahedan’s approximate deficit of 1,000 litres per second.

The plan must identify the actual capacity of available sources, the timetable for bringing new supplies online, the method of distributing water among neighbourhoods, and urgent measures for elevated areas, marginalized districts, and national housing developments.

2. Public access to water data

Information on water production, consumption, shortages, water quality, pressure reductions, outages, network losses, and project implementation must be published monthly and broken down by city, district, and village.

Residents must be able to determine how much funding each project has received, how far it has progressed, and when it will begin delivering water in practice.

3. Immediate rehabilitation of deteriorated networks

The Ministry of Energy must present an annually funded programme for replacing deteriorated pipes, reducing leakage, and lowering network losses.

Measurable targets for reducing water loss in every city and rural district must be announced, and progress must be independently assessed.

4. Completion of water projects in deprived villages

For the more than 700 villages in the Chabahar constituency and all other villages without continuous drinking water, the authorities must publish a priority list, confirmed funding, and a completion date for each project.

Nominal connection to a network must not be reported as project completion where sufficient and continuous water is not actually available.

5. Regulation and oversight of tanker deliveries

Until permanent networks are completed, tanker delivery must be free, regular, and subject to public oversight.

Delivery times, village allocations, water-quality information, and tanker routes must be recorded and made available to local councils. Adequate vehicles and fuel must be guaranteed for isolated villages.

6. Assistance for low-income households

Emergency assistance must be provided to families forced by water outages to purchase tanks, pumps, or private water.

Schools, medical centres, and households with children, older residents, patients, or people with disabilities must receive priority during emergency distribution.

7. Securing hootags and providing safe alternatives

Hootags near villages must be fenced and made safer without delay. Fencing alone, however, is not enough.

Every village dependent on a hootag must be provided with a storage tank, treatment system, or another safe and accessible source so that residents are no longer forced to draw water directly from open ponds.

8. Emergency electricity for critical water facilities

All desalination plants, major wells, treatment facilities, and pumping stations must be equipped with emergency generators, adequate fuel, and backup equipment.

A continuity plan for water services during power failures, floods, military attacks, or transport disruptions must be published and regularly tested.

9. Sustainable management of water resources

The crisis cannot be resolved solely by increasing groundwater extraction.

The government must control unsustainable pumping, groundwater salinization, inefficient irrigation, and the cultivation of highly water-intensive crops. At the same time, farmers and livestock owners must receive financial support, appropriate irrigation technology, and access to alternative livelihoods.

10. Pursuit of the Helmand water share and protection of Hamun

The government must publish regular and verifiable reports on Helmand River inflows, implementation of the 1973 treaty, and negotiations with Afghanistan.

Alongside the provision of drinking water, the environmental water needs of the Hamun wetlands and the livelihoods of the people of Sistan must be given a clear place in national water policy.

11. Independent oversight and community participation

An oversight body must be formed with the participation of independent specialists, city and village council representatives, academics, environmental activists, representatives of Baluch and Sistani communities, and public-health institutions.

It must monitor budgets, water quality, project implementation, and emergency distribution, and publish its findings.

12. Equality and non-discrimination

Access to safe drinking water must not depend on a person’s place of residence, ethnicity, religion, income, or distance from an urban centre.

Poor and remote villages must be prioritized according to the severity of deprivation and human need, rather than political influence or the narrow economic return of a project.

Conclusion

The people of Sistan and Baluchestan do not need another set of promises. They need safe water, adequate pressure, a clear timetable, verifiable information, and accountable institutions.

Safe drinking water is not a privilege, an act of charity, or a secondary demand. It is a fundamental human right, and its provision is a direct and undeniable responsibility of the state.

We call on the responsible authorities to issue a formal and public response to this petition and to publish regular progress reports until every city and village in the province has reliable access to safe drinking water.

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Related petitions:

Improve Urban Sanitation in Sistan and Baluchistan Province

Drowning of Baluch Children in Hootegs